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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 16/02/2004

Accident number: 221

Accident time: 09:30

Accident Date: 14/11/1997

Where it occurred: Tusla-Dobaj road

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: WL/DD/PI/MP/CG

Date of main report: 18/11/1997
Name of source: BiH MAC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PROM-1 AP Bfrag

Ground condition: woodland leaf litter,
wet

Date record created: 16/02/2004

Date last modified: 16/02/2004

No of victims: 2

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR: BQ974375

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
dog missed mine (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
inadequate training (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
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Accident report
A Board of Inquiry report was ordered by the country MAC and carried out by
representatives of the MAC, the QA, and an ex-pat Technical Advisor, observed by a
representative from the demining company. The report was made available and the following
summarises its content.
The demining group appear to have been operating a three-man team with a one-man drill.
Victim No.1 was cutting undergrowth, detecting and prodding, while Victim No.2 "controlled"
him and the third team member rested.
The mined area was a "rectangular wooded area" next to a road. Vegetation was described
as "sparse undergrowth" and "immature oaks". The ground was covered by fallen leaves and
the earth below "saturated". Work had stopped after one hour on the day before because of
rain. Work started at 09:00 on the day of the incident, when the rain stopped. Three teams
were working at the site with three separate Control Points. The Control Point for the
accident team was not correctly marked and there was no "safe route" marked between it
and the start point.
A QA monitor was on the site at all times.
When work started a dog handler and dog searched the accident area - 2 x 9 meter lane - for
in between ten and fifteen minutes. A change of wind direction and the presence of cut
undergrowth in the lane led the handler to search the lane from both ends. The dog did not
signal but the handler later claimed to have warned the victim that the behaviour of the dog
had changed so he should be careful.
The victim then started to search the lane with his metal detector. Victim no.2 was standing
about 25 metres from his partner. When the accident occurred, Victim No.1 was not holding
his detector. When the changeover of the team members was ordered, the police allowed
movement of traffic on the adjacent road.
At 9:30 a PROM-1 exploded "close to the centre of the base line". The investigators decided
that Victim no.1 stepped on the mine with his left foot and he was thrown to his left into the
cleared area. His partner was on his knees leaning forward to pick up equipment and was
facing away from the accident.
Victim No.2 had sustained fragment wounds to his "left foot and back". Victim No.1 was "very
seriously injured". Medics attended them and they arrived at Tuzla hospital within 25 minutes
of the detonation. The Team Leader stated that Victim No.1 yelled that his leg was injured.
The third member of the team searched around the deminer.
The QA monitor claimed that the victim was seen searching the full width of the lane with his
detector. When it was demonstrated to him that he could not see the victim from his position
at the time, he changed his statement. He said that the amount of brushwood in the lane had
been reduced, so it was possible that Victim No.1 had thrown some aside.
The group used the end-of-lane marking stick to detect tripwires, then cut the vegetation
over the entire width and searches with a metal detector. There was very little vegetation in
the search area, but there was a carpet of wet leaves. The investigators decided that Victim
No.1 had missed an area with his detector and failed to locate the mine. They thought that
the visual identification of other mines in the area may have given him a false sense of
security.
A mine dog had searched the area 15 minutes before the accident.
The detector in use was a Schiebel AN 19/2. It was damaged and inoperative after the
accident. Its batteries were checked and found to be "operative".
The investigators examined the protective helmet, visors and frag-jackets of the victim and
found them "in good condition and undamaged".
The contract held by the demining company allowed them to claim full pay for any time when
inclement weather prevented work, so they were not under pressure to hurry.
The mine was identified by its base plate. Fragments of tripwire were found but the
investigators decided that it was unlikely to have initiated the mine.
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The Team Leader thought that the excess water prevented the dog locating the mine.

Conclusion
The investigators decided that Victim No.1 probably believed the area was safe because it
had been checked by the dog. They were "unable to draw any meaningful conclusions about
the dog's performance on that day". They felt that Victim No.1 was "not sufficiently
systematic" in his detector search.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that the deminers should adhere to the group's SOPs and
not use end-of-lane markers as tripwire feelers, mark sites properly, mark the lane properly
as manual demining advances in a lane [the group's approved SOPs did not require this],
use detectors appropriately and discourage deminers "from believing that an area is 100%
cleared because a mine-detection dog has been over it". They also recommended using a
MAC approved detector.
The demining team involved were told to undergo a day retraining, and the demining
company to revise their SOPs.
They recommended that Victim No.1 should receive 100% insurance…. the paragraph
continued but had been excised… at DM 300,000, and that victim No.2 should have his
condition monitored for six months to ensure complete recovery and that a "competent
medical authority should decide whether … he has a claim for compensation under [the
demining group's] insurance".
The head of the MAC (then UN controlled) issued a memo ordering that recommendations
on compensation be excised from the report, but they were in the copy held on file.

Victim Report
Victim number: 285

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 25 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: none

Helmet
Short visor

Summary of injuries:
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
COMMENT
The victim's injuries were not detailed but were called "severe". See medical report.
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Medical report
No field medic or hospital reports were on file and the investigators did not give any details of
Victim No.1's injuries.
A verbal report from a Technical Advisor at the country MAC indicated that the mine was
deeply buried and "stuck" in some way so that Victim No.1 escaped the full fragmentation
effect. His leg was traumatically amputated below the knee.

Victim Report
Victim number: 286

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 25 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: not recorded

Helmet
Short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Body
minor Foot
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the
investigators determined that Victim No.1 did not use his detector adequately and his error
was not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” because it seems
likely that victim did not understand the need to use his detector correctly. The detector,
while an old model, should have been readily capable of finding the large metal mine but
may not have been in good working order. Why the group was using a detector that was
incapable of finding the AP blast mines in the country was unexplained.
The report stated that the protective wear worn by both victims was undamaged, yet Victim
No.2 was injured by fragments in the back at a distance of 25 meters, and Victim No.1 was
so severely injured that he deserved 100% compensation. In other incidents with this mine
the protection has been severely damaged by fragments. It seems likely that the protective
equipment was not being worn by the victims.

Related papers
Other documents on file include a sketch map of the site, a detailed map, details of the
detector test that show a 50% decline after two hours of battery use and crater analysis, the
dog's "history", photographs of the site and statements of team members.
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A copy of the insurance from "Aster International… Alexandria VA 22312" re "accidental
death and dismemberment policy" raises questions over whether it provided adequate cover.
The medical expenditure was limited to US$5k for any one person and included "Broad form
Exclusion" - No coverage for worker's compensation or employers’ liability.
"Coverage is provided for demining operations in Bosnia and Croatia per contract with the
World Bank. Premium is $51,300 based on $5.4M contract revenue with World Bank…"
"Accidental Death and Disablement Continental Scale excluding disabilities paying less than
20% of the capital sum" Capital sum: DM300,000 - Premium DM 305 for "Deminers handling
mines, defusing and exposure to mines".

Original BoI report
What follows is the original BoI report (edited for anonymity).
REPORT OF BOARD OF INQUIRY ON ACCIDENT 14 NOVEMBER 1997
18 November 1997
INTRODUCTION
1. A Board of Inquiry was convened on 15 November 1997 to investigate the circumstances
in which two employees of [Demining group collaboration between one international
company and two national companies] were injured during mine clearance operations in
the Tuzla area on 14 November.
2. The Board was convened by the United Nations Mine Action Centre in accordance with
the provisions of Section VI of the following contract ("the Contract") FED-CW-A007/97 –
TZ dated 14 June 1997, between Emergency Landmine Clearance Project
Implementation Unit, Ministry of spatial Planning and Environment, Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina ("PIU") and [Demining group international company] of the USA.
3. The Board comprised:
a.

Chairman - UN MAC

b.

Member - Director, Federal PIU (15 November only)

c.

Member - Advisor, Federal Project Implementation Unit

d.

Member - Supervisor, Tuzla Region PIU (16 November only)

[Name excised], representing [Demining group] was present throughout the Board of Inquiry
investigation.
In addition, two EOD specialists from the UN MAC were appointed to assist the Board by
testing equipment and carrying out crater analysis and mine identification.
TERMS OF REFERENCE
4. A copy of the Board's Terms of Reference are attached at Annex A
5. At a meeting held at the UN MAC prior to the formal opening of the Board, it was agreed
that paragraph 4 of the Terms of Reference should include an obligation on the Board to:
"ascertain whether or not, commercial contract considerations may have contributed to
the cause of the accident."
SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES OF TASKING
6. [Demining group] had been correctly tasked by the PIU in accordance with the provisions
of the Contract and had been provided with information on known minefields in the area
by the UN MAC prior to the commencement of work.
GEOGRAPHY
7. The site at which [Demining group] were operating is a small rectangular wooded area
immediately adjacent to the main Tuzla-Doboj road, centred at Grid Reference
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BQ974375. It is five kilometres from [Demining group]'s Tuzla Region base and 22
kilometres from Tuzla.
8. The trees are mainly immature oaks with sparse undergrowth but the ground has a heavy
carpet of fallen leaves.
9. The site is generally flat and below the level of the adjacent main road. It drains from a
south-westerly direction towards a ditch immediately beside the road. At the time of the
accident, the soil beneath the carpet of recently fallen leaves was saturated with water.
10. Work had stopped after only an hour on the previous day – Thursday - because of rain.
Light rain had fallen during the night of Thursday / Friday and work had not commenced
on the site on Friday 15 November until 0900 hrs because of rain.
PRIORITY OF TASK
11. Occupied houses are situated immediately adjacent to the south-west side of the site and
the main Tuzla - Doboj road forms the north west boundary of the site. This road is a
major communications route. During the past eighteen months, fatal casualties have
occurred within the site, which local inhabitants have entered to gather firewood.
12. The Tuzla Canton specifically requested that this site should be cleared.
13. Under an earlier contract which ended in May 1997, [Demining group] had worked at the
same site.
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING
14. A plan of the site ("the Woods") is attached at Annex B showing the direction of
clearance.
15. Three teams were operating at the Woods. Teams 1 and 8 operated in a single section of
their allocated area of the site. Team 5 was split into two parties and worked in two
sections of their allocated area of the site.
16. Since each team operated from a different part of the cultivated agricultural areas at
either end of the Woods, there were 3 separate Control Points. The Control Point for
Team 1 (the Team whose members were injured) was situated next to a haystack in a
field adjacent to the main road. It was not marked in accordance with [Demining group]'s
SOPs. It was stated that this was because the area was known to be mine free since:
•

Children used the field as a play area.

•

A hay crop had been cut and was stacked in the field.

•

[Demining group] had previous worked at the same site.

17. There was no staked/taped Access Route from the Control Point to the cleared area
adjacent to the Start Point, although from the ground markings it was obvious that a single
route was used between the Control Point and the Start Point.
18. Marking of the area between cleared and uncleared areas in the Woods was by use of 1
metre high red topped stakes at three metre intervals and with short red topped stakes at
one metre intervals between the 1 metre stakes. Plastic tape was fixed between all the
stakes.
SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE
19. [Demining group] have eight teams working in the Sizje area. This includes five teams on
a hill site ("the Hill") approximately 1½ kilometres from the Woods and three teams in the
Woods. [Demining group]'s supervisory structure is as follows:
Tuzla Region Manager
Operations Officer
(present at either the Hill or Woods site whilst
operations are in progress)
Deputy Operations Officer(responsibe for Woods and present at all times whilst
operations are in progress)
Team Leader
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The on-site supervisor was the Deputy Operations Officer, [name excised].
PIU Representative. The Site Monitor, [name excised] had been with Team No. 1
since the beginning of the contract on 7 July. He is a qualified Geologist and was
the Head of his Department at the University of Tuzla.
QUALITY ASSURANCE
20. Part of the Quality Assurance process is the presence at each site of Site Monitors
employed by the Regional PIU. Each [Demining group] team has a PIU Site Monitor. The
role of the Site Monitor is to ensure that the contractor carries out the work as agreed with
the PIU, particularly with respect to working methods, safety and effectiveness.
COMMUNICATIONS
21. [Demining group]'s radio communications network is comprehensive and works well. Each
team leader has a hand held VHF radio and at both the Woods and Hill are able to speak
direct to all levels of Supervision including [Demining group]'s base at Koksara.
22. VHF radios are supplemented by vehicle-mounted HF radios. [Demining group] regional
office is equipped with a base station and several PTT telephones.
MEDICAL
23. A properly equipped ambulance was present at both the Woods and Hill site on 14
November.
24. The No. 1 Team medic is a qualified medical general practitioner who immediately
responded to the scene of the accident from his position at the Control Point,
approximately 100 metres away. He had a full trauma medical kit and stretcher. Team
medics from three other teams also provided assistance. Each had a full trauma medical
kit.
PERSONALITIES INVOLVED
25. Team No. 1 sustained the accident. Their names are:
Team Leader
Medic
No. 1 Deminer sustained injuries.
No. 2 Deminer sustained minor injuries
No. 3 Deminer
Dog handler
Mine Detection Dog
EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS
26. Team No. 1 was equipped with standard demining hand-tools used for cutting vegetation
in clearance lanes.
27. The metal detector was damaged during the explosion and was inoperative when tested.
The batteries were operative. Metal detector used by the team was a Schiebel AN 19/2.
See Metal Detector test report attached as Annex C.
DETAILS OF MINE INVOLVED
28. The mine involved was a PROM 1 Bounding Fragmentation mine. Probably activated by
Deminer No. 1 stepping directly onto the mine with his left foot. See crater analysis at
Annex D.
EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING
29. There was no evidence or suspicion of re-mining at any part of the task site.
DRESS & PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
30. Each member of Team No. 1 was equipped with a helmet and attached visor and a
ballistic jacket. Both the injured deminers were wearing helmets / visors and ballistic
jackets at the time of the explosion. Examination of these items of protective dress
showed that they were in good condition and undamaged.
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USE OF DOGS
31. A mine dog had searched the area where the accident occurred, approximately fifteen
minutes before the explosion. [Name excised] is an experienced mine dog and had
recently undergone continuation training. Details of Brenda’s demining record are
attached as Annex E.
32. The dog handler has worked with [the dog] since he completed his training at the end of
December 1996. He has worked with [the dog] for the whole time since then. Both have
worked with Team 1 since the start of the contract.
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON 14 NOVEMBER
33. The following account summarises the responses to questions by members of the Board,
directed to members of Team 1, Supervisors and the Site Monitor. Written statements
made by team members are at Annex F.
34. Commencement of Work. On Thursday 13 November, the teams had been able to work
for approximately 1 hour only before having to stop because of rain. When the teams
arrived at the Woods on the morning of Friday 15 November, light rain was falling. They
remained in their vehicles on the side of the main Tuzla-Doboj road, which had been
closed by the civil police at approximately 0800 hrs. By 0900hrs the rain had stopped and
work had commenced.
35. Search by Dog. The Dog Handler and [dog] commenced a search of an area
approximately two metres wide by nine metres deep ("the lane") adjacent to the area
cleared by Team 1 earlier in the week. Because of the presence of previously cut
brushwood approximately half way along the lane in the direction of clearance and a
change of wind direction, the dog searched from two directions. Firstly from the Base Line
to the brushwood and then from the cleared area to the right of the lane beyond the
brushwood. Because of the presence of brushwood, the dog was unable to search the
whole lane.
36. The dog did not indicate the presence of mines at any time during its search of the area,
but the dog handler noticed a change of behaviour during part of the dog’s search. When
the dog and handler completed the search of the lane, they moved back towards the
Control Point. The dog handler states that he warned the No. 1 Deminer, who had acted
as his spotter, to be careful because of the change that he had observed in the behaviour
in the dog.
37. The total time taken by the dog to clear the lane was between ten and fifteen minutes.
38. Manual Search. The No. 1 Deminer moved to the Start Point and commenced his search.
Immediately prior to this time No. 1 Deminer was told by the Deputy Operations Manager
to set his metal detector at maximum sensitivity. No. 2 Deminer states that the No. 1
cleared an area approximately 70 centimetres deep. No. 2 Deminer was standing
approximately 25 metres to the right of the No. 1, at an ideal angle to judge the distance
No. 1 moved from the Base Line. At the time of the explosion, the No. 1 Deminer was not
holding his metal detector.
39. Thirty minutes after work had commenced, the No.1 and No. 2 Deminers were due to
changeover. At such times, it was the practice for the civilian police and SFOR police to
permit traffic to move in both directions past the Woods on the adjacent main road.
40. At 0930 hrs when the changeover was in progress, a PROM mine detonated close to the
centre of the Base Line.
41. Moment of Explosion. At the moment of explosion, No. 1 Deminer was thrown to his right
into the previously cleared area.
42. The No. 2 Deminer had bent down to pick up some mine tape and stakes and was facing
away from the No. 1 Deminer.
43. The Deputy Operations Officer and the Site Monitor were on the main road, on the side
opposite from the woods, walking from the direction of the Control Point, towards the
clearance lane and a position on the road adjacent to the lane.
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44. The Team Medic was at the Control Point.
45. The Team Leader and the No. 3 Deminer was between the Control Point and the lane,
approximately 25 metres from the lane.
46. Immediate Action. Deminer No. 3 and the Team Medic reached the site of explosion first
and applied first aid and stabilised the patient. Team Medics from other teams were
summoned to assist.
47. Both the No.1 Deminer, who was very seriously injured and the No. 2 Deminer, who had
sustained shrapnel wounds to his left foot and back, were evacuated by road in [Demining
group]'s ambulance to the Tuzla main hospital. They arrived at the hospital within
approximately twenty-five minutes of the explosion occurring.
COMMERCIAL CONTRACT CONSIDERATIONS
48. Supervisors at all levels were asked if they were given productivity targets to meet. All
stated that they were not under any pressure to achieve particular levels of productivity
and the Team Leader and Deputy Operations Officer appeared to be unaware of the level
of daily and weekly productivity which would qualify for 100% payment by the PIU.
49. The Regional Manager stated that he is not under any pressure to achieve productivity
targets and stated that he was only prepared to work at rates of productivity that would
permit safe working practice.
50. The Regional Manager confirmed that in the event of having to stop work because of bad
weather, after confirmation by the Regional PIU Supervisor, [Demining group] could claim
full payment for each such day that work could not proceed due to bad weather.
COMMENTS BY THE BOARD
51. No. 2 Deminer. The only person close enough to the No. 1 Deminer to have been able to
observe him working in the lane for the period of between ten and fifteen minutes prior to
the explosion was the No. 2 Deminer. He has stated that the No. 1 Deminer moved
approximately 70 centimetres into the lane from the Base Line. From his position 25
metres to the right of the No. 1 Deminer, it is unlikely that he could have seen if the No. 1
was searching across the whole width of the lane or not.
52. Site Monitor. When first questioned on 15 November, the Site Monitor stated that the No.
1 Deminer had cleared from the Base Line to the end of the lane using his metal detector
and in accordance with [Demining group]'s SOPs. He said that the No. 1 Deminer would
have cleared the two-metre wide lane in one-metre increments.
53. The Site Monitor was taken to the Woods on 17 November by two members of the Board
and pointed out the positions he occupied on the road during the time both the dog and
the No. 1 Deminer were searching the lane. He could not have seen whether or not the
No. 1 was using his metal detector across the whole 2-metre width of the lane and stated
that he is not sure if the No. 1 Deminer moved much beyond the Base Line. He says that
there was less brushwood in the centre of the lane immediately after the explosion than
there had been when the dog had been searching. It may therefore be possible that the
No. 1 moved the brushwood and threw it into the cleared area to his right.
54. The Site Monitor stated that the three red-topped 1 metre wooden stakes positioned to
the left and the two at the end of the lane were probably positioned after the accident. He
cannot be sure if they were in position before the accident. If they were, the only person
who could have positioned them was the No. 1 Deminer. Team Leader states that these
stakes were placed prior to accident.
55. The Site Monitor's first statement should be disregarded, as it is likely he was saying what
he believed should have happened, not what actually happened.
56. Team Leader. At the site, the Team Leader was asked if the red-topped, 1 metre wooden
stakes and connecting yellow tape to the left and at the end of the clearance lane were in
position immediately after the explosion. He replied that they were and said that they were
not put in place after the explosion. He said the No. 1 Deminer had positioned the stakes.
At no time had the Team Leader been in a position to observe the actions of the No. 1
Deminer.
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57. No. 3 Deminer. The No. 3 Deminer described manual demining drills for a two-metre wide
lane that had previously been searched by a dog. He stated that, after a visual search, the
base-stick would be used to detect tripwires, then the entire width of the two-metre lane
would be cleared of vegetation and searched with a metal detector.
58. Although this procedure is not in accordance with [Demining group] SOPs, the Team
leader confirmed that it was correct.
SUMMARY
59. Three [Demining group] teams had worked at the Woods for a total of six days prior to the
accident. During this time, Team No. 1 had located the following mines within the area
cleared as shown:
6 Nov

2 x PROM – area cleared on that day (8 hours) 300 square metres.

12 Nov 4 x PMA-2 - area cleared on that day (8 hours) 450 square metres.
60. The PROM mines located on 6 Nov had been sighted visually from the main road. Their
fuses were above the ground. This may have given the No. 1 Deminer a false sense of
security, because he may have thought that any other PROM mines in the area would be
sighted visually or located by the dog.
61. The dog did not alert during its search of the lane on 14 November but its behaviour
changed. The dog handler states that he told the No. 1 Deminer to be careful during his
manual clearance.
62. The No. 1 Deminer failed to locate a PROM mine located within the area that the No. 2
Deminer stated the No. 1 had cleared. Deminer No. 2 states that the No. 1 had between
10 and 15 minutes to search an area of less than 2 square metres, which apart from a
carpet of leaves had very little vegetation on it.
63. The Site Monitor confirms that the No. 1 Deminer was told by the Deputy Operations
Manager to set his metal detector at maximum sensitivity.
64. It is unlikely that the No. 1 Deminer cleared to the end of the lane. This makes his failure
to locate a PROM mine difficult to explain. He probably did not use the metal detector
methodically or as required by SOPs. He did not sweep the entire width of the two-metre
lane. It is possible that he carried out a cursory sweep of the area immediately to his front
and then moved forward to remove the cut brushwood. If so, this could account for the
amount of time he was working and the absence of the brushwood immediately after the
explosion. The mine should have been detected.
65. It is likely that on reaching the end of his work period, the No 1 Deminer turned around
and walked back the few steps to the Base Line but moved slightly to his left, across an
area that he had not previously swept with his mine detector. He activated the mine by the
direct pressure of his left foot.
66. Crater analysis shows that the mine was buried in water saturated soil. Tests conducted
in the crater with an FFE PROM mine showed that it could be located easily with a
Schiebel metal detector at a depth of 220mm. The fragments of trip wire found near the
crater are unlikely to have initiated the mine.
67. It is likely that the No. 1 Deminer activated the mine by the direct pressure of his left foot
as he walked out of the clearance lane.
68. All actions after the explosion were carried out correctly. The casualties were properly
treated and promptly evacuated to hospital.
69. [Demining group]'s structure of supervision at the Woods was entirely adequate.
70. The protective equipment issued to [Demining group] staff is suitable for use in demining
operations.
71. Metal detectors tested at the task site were all in good condition and were capable of
finding a buried PROM mine. Although [Demining group] have UN MAC approved Guartel
MD-8 metal detectors, they were not used at this site.
CONCLUSIONS
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72. Deminer No. 1 probably believed that the area was clear because a dog had been over it.
Although the dog did not fully indicate on the mine, the board are unable to draw any
meaningful conclusions about the dog’s performance on that day. Although the ground
was wet and muddy, conditions were not bad enough to make manual clearance drills
unsafe.
73. The No. 1 Deminer probably used his metal detector over an area approximately 1 metre
deep by 2 metres wide. He failed to locate the mine because he was not sufficiently
systematic in his search. If he had carried out his clearance drills in accordance with
[Demining group] SOPs, he would have located the mine.
74. There is no evidence that team 1 was under pressure to achieve any productivity target.
RECOMMENDATIONS
75. [Demining group] demining teams should adhere to all aspects of their SOPs. The
following points should be particularly addressed.
•

Base-sticks should not be used as tripwire feelers.

•

Marking of areas and lanes at the site should be in accordance with SOPs.

•

Lane marking should ensure that no-one walks over an area until it has been
confirmed as cleared.

•

A manual deminer working in a clearance lane should mark the lane as he
moves forward. – The responsibility to position stakes and marking tape
should not be left to the No. 2 deminer.

•

Metal detector drills.

•

Drills for use in one-metre wide manual demining lanes.

[Demining group] should amend their SOPs to include use of the base-stick in accordance
with MAC Technical Guidelines.
Deminers should be discouraged from believing that an area is 100% cleared because a
mine-detection dog has been over it.
Consideration should be given to the use of metal detectors approved by UN MAC.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
76. The Board of Inquiry recommends that [Demining group] updates their Standing
Operational Procedures and that these are passed to UN MAC for review.
77. The team involved in this accident should undergo a minimum of one days retraining.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
78. No disciplinary procedures are recommended.
COMPENSATION
[Victim No.1], the seriously injured No. 1 Deminer should receive the full amount of any
insurance compensation payment made by the insurance company to [Demining group]. This
should be paid regardless of anyone’s responsibility for any part of the accident.
The PIU should arrange that [Victim No.2]'s medical condition be reviewed in 6 months. In
order to establish whether he has a claim for compensation under the terms of [Demining
group]’s insurance.
Signed:
Adviser Fed PIU
Director Fed PIU
Supervisor, Tuzla Regional PIU
UN MAC
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Annexes: (not made available)
Annex A – Terms of Reference.
Annex B – Sketch map of site.
Annex C – Details of detector test.
Annex D – Details of crater analysis.
Annex E – Mine-Detecting Dog’s history.
Annex F – Statements of team members.
Annex G – Photographs of site.
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